What does the US election mean for Africa?
Unsurprisingly, US-Africa policy has not featured in the debate between US presidential candidates, Donald Trump and Kamala Harris. However, the outcome of November’s election has significant consequences for the nature of US interest and engagement in Africa.
A Trump presidency will signal the greatest change in the US’ strategy in Africa. Africa is expected to be of far more interest to policymakers than during Trump’s previous term. Nonetheless, despite several drastic proposals for US strategy in Africa, a certain level of continuity is expected, notably building on key relationships developed with Kenya and Angola under Joe Biden.
Change under Biden
Biden has led the deepest engagement of any US president in Africa in the last 30 years. Over the last four years, the US has developed new key allies in the continent. In Kenya, President William Ruto has become the White House’s main conduit for strategic influence in the region, with Kenya designated a major non-NATO US ally in June. Angola has emerged as strategic partner for access to battery metals via US interest in the Lobito Corridor rail project. Although Biden’s planned trip to Angola in October was postponed, it would have been the first visit by a sitting US president to Sub-Saharan Africa since Barack Obama’s visit to Kenya and Ethiopia in 2015. A growth in US strategic interest in Zambia and Côte d'Ivoire has also been notable.
On the other hand, Russian influence has entrenched in the Sahel and active US security influence in the region has fallen (notably, withdrawals from Niger and a dilution of influence in Djibouti).
Common ground or common issues?
No matter who is in the White House, both candidates are aware that China is Africa’s largest trading partner and that access to critical minerals is paramount. This competition has already driven the US’ approach in Angola and a change in administration is unlikely to prompt any major re-assessment of this priority (or the relationship with Angola in particular). With China’s move to ‘small is beautiful’ foreign policy and lending, the Belt and Road Initiative is not the same behemoth it was, and US interest in infrastructure support is likely to grow.
Questions remain over the future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the duty-free trade preference programme and a key framework for US commercial engagement in Africa. AGOA expires in September 2025 and the new president will likely reform how AGOA works (or if there is still a need for AGOA).
AGOA stipulates eligibility criteria: democratic progress, anti-corruption, protecting human rights, etc. These requirements are likely to be updated under a new presidency and reflect US priorities in fostering bilateral relations in Africa. Under Trump, the US launched Prosper Africa as a parallel effort with an additional aim of offsetting Russian and Chinese influence. Under Biden, Prosper Africa became more focused on energy, climate and health outcomes. Prosper Africa also offers another variable in how AGOA is used going forward.
This dynamic also impacts bilateral relations. Biden scrapped the Trump administration’s bilateral agreement with Kenya, but Biden’s US-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership (STIP) could be scrapped if it is not signed before January. STIP – which carried forward many aspects of the Trump deal, but introduced components on law, governance, corruption and workers’ rights – was meant to be a blueprint for a new trade relationship with African countries (a model that possibly supersedes AGOA). If Trump wins, then such broader requirements are more likely to be scrapped from bilateral relationships.
Differences in approach
In the event of a Kamala Harris presidency, the expectation is continuity. Harris’ campaign has not released any hint of an Africa policy, but is expected to continue the doctrine set out in the Democrats’ strategy towards Africa. This includes a likely doubling down on the relationships in Africa established under Biden and continuing to advocate for greater multilateralism and African representation in global institutions.
A Trump win would have immediate diplomatic implications. In the event of a change in administration it is common policy for politically-appointed US ambassadors to resign, meaning a greater changing of the guard in the event of a Trump win. The African countries with politically-appointed US ambassadors are: Kenya, Morocco, South Africa and Tanzania.
Trump’s Africa policy is not a complete unknown. During his first two years in office, Trump showed very little interest in Africa, carrying forward many of the policies of his predecessors. This included security commitments inherited from Obama, until withdrawing US forces from Somalia at the very end of his term (something Biden then reversed in 2022). Trump’s most outlandish foreign policy move was to recognise Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in a deal where the quid pro quo saw Morocco normalise relations with Israel.
The Republican camp’s policy wish list, Project 2025, also outlines specific policy recommendations on Sub-Saharan Africa for a Trump presidency (almost two pages out of a 900-page document), including: offsetting Chinese influence; tying foreign aid to strategic goals; increasing security cooperation with African countries; and cutting the US’ promotion of abortion and pro-LGBTQ+ initiatives. The latter would likely come as part of a major overhaul in funding for development-focused government agencies. USAID would likely face a major reworking in its funding, how it works and what its focus areas are.
Bizarrely, Project 2025 also includes a recommendation to recognise the sovereignty of Somaliland as a “hedge” for countering Chinese influence in the Horn of Africa. It remains to be seen how much of Project 2025 will make it into Trump’s agenda, but wading into the Somaliland question as a perceived isolated issue would have major implications for politics and security in the Horn of Africa.
Outside of Project 2025, there is also reportedly a desire among conservatives in the US to punish South Africa vis-à-vis its position regarding Russia and Israel, given South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It is unclear what this would translate to on the policy front and has not yet made its way into any form of policy recommendation.
If past changes in US administration are anything to go by, then any changes to US policy and activity in Africa will take a while to come to fruition. In the shorter term, AGOA’s reauthorisation requires more immediate attention and will provide an early indicator of some of the new administration’s priorities in Africa.
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